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Welfare is often administered locally, but financed through grants from the central 
government. This raises the question how the central government can prevent local 
governments from spending more than necessary. Block grants are more efficient 
than matching grants, because the latter reduce the local governments’ incentive to 
limit welfare spending. However, conventional block grant financing is less equitable, 
indeed, it may put a heavy burden on local governments in economically weak 
regions. This paper considers block grants which depend on exogenous spending 
need determinants, and are estimated from previous period welfare spending. This 
allocation method gives rise to perverse incentives by reducing the marginal costs of 
welfare spending. We derive the conditions for such a grant to be more efficient than 
a matching grant, and apply our results to the Netherlands, where such a grant exists 
since 2004. We conclude that the Dutch style grant is likely to be more efficient than 
a matching grant. As it is also more equitable, other countries might want to consider 
introducing a similar grant. 
 
Keywords: Welfare financing, Grant allocation, Block grant, Efficiency, 
Equity. 
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1. Introduction 
In many countries, the payment of welfare benefits to the needy is a responsibility of 
subnational governments. Decentralization allows public services to be tailored to 
local preferences (Oates, 1972). Decentralization may also be more efficient (Hayek, 
1945), as knowledge of local circumstances is needed to successfully run a welfare 
program. However, decentralized finance of redistributive programs is likely to break 
down as a result of the migration patterns it brings about (‘race to the bottom’). 
Therefore, income redistribution is generally considered the responsibility of the 
central government. As a result, welfare is usually administered locally, but financed 
centrally. This raises the question as to how the center can induce local administrators 
to administer welfare efficiently in such a situation. In this paper, we interpret 
efficient administration as implementing programs to assist recipients in moving from 
welfare to work and carrying out fraud investigations in such a way that the number 
of welfare recipients is minimized.1 With efficient administration, only those who 
really need it receive a welfare benefit. Thus, the policy question is: if the money for 
benefits is coming from elsewhere, what is to stop local administrators from being 
overly generous?  
 
In the last decades, many countries have introduced some kind of welfare reform. 
Two important types of reform concern a change in financing (notably a shift from 
matching grants to block grants) and a decentralization of welfare policy (notably, of 
discretion over eligibility and welfare levels). The 1996 welfare reform in the US, 
which has attracted a lot of attention in the literature, combines both types of reform. 
Within European countries, however, regional differences in welfare eligibility and 
benefit levels are much less – or not at all – tolerated. In this paper we focus on the 
case of a uniform welfare policy, where local government behavior can be controlled 
only by grant allocation. The question then is: how to optimize the design of the grant 
to the decentralized governments which administer welfare? 
 
                                                 
1
 We ignore technical inefficiency by assuming that active labor market policies and fraud 
investigations are produced at minimum cost. 
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One way to provide incentives for efficiency is to provide local administrators with 
block grants rather than matching grants. However, the choice between matching 
grants and block grants involves a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Matching 
grants are not efficient because they reduce the costs to the local government of an 
extra welfare beneficiary. Therefore, they reduce the incentive of the local 
administration to keep welfare dependency at a minimum. On the other hand, 
matching grants are equitable because they guarantee that the central government 
shoulders an equal share of every local government’s welfare burden. As a result, 
jurisdictions with high welfare spending needs due to exogenous circumstances 
receive a larger grant. In contrast, block grants are efficient, as they do not lower the 
cost of additional welfare recipients. But this comes at a price, as there is generally no 
guarantee that the welfare burden of every local government is shared by the central 
government to the same extent. Block grant financing may force local governments in 
economically backward regions to spend considerable sums of money from their own 
resources on welfare, while jurisdictions in affluent regions may not need to spend all 
their grant money on welfare.  
 
Welfare is an entitlement program; people who qualify cannot be denied welfare. The 
grant system should reflect this. The challenge is thus to develop a grant allocation 
method which is both (sufficiently) efficient and (sufficiently) equitable. The Dutch 
2004 welfare reform attempts to do so. An important feature of the Dutch system is 
that it aims at allocating block grants in such a way that municipalities which operate 
efficiently will not need to use own resources to finance welfare expenditures. At the 
same time, total grants add up to no more than forecasted aggregated welfare 
expenditures. If successfully applied, this should enable the Dutch to enjoy the 
benefits of block grants, without the disadvantage associated with them. 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of welfare reform along the Dutch lines. Thus, we 
depart from the extensive literature on the optimal design of intergovernmental grants, 
but focus instead on the pros and cons of the specific type of grant system that is used 
in the Netherlands. The Dutch reform may be seen as an attempt to answer the 
question how local governments can be induced to administer welfare efficiently, 
while at the same time keeping eligibility and welfare levels uniform. The answer to 
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this question may also be relevant for other programs besides welfare, e.g., health or 
education programs.  
 
The Dutch system seems to provide an attractive solution to promote efficient 
administration. We show, however, that the system has a weakness. In our basic 
framework, a local government decides on its inefficiency level, maximizing its 
objective function. In doing so, the local administrator balances marginal costs and 
benefits of welfare spending. As explained above, a matching grant is inefficient 
because it reduces the costs of an extra welfare beneficiary. That is, a matching grant 
directly decreases marginal costs of welfare spending – and thus of working 
inefficiently – and thereby affects the efficiency choice of local administrators, 
leading to a higher level of inefficiency. A standard block grant does not have this 
problem, and neither does the Dutch grant. However, the Dutch system makes future 
grants depend on current expenditures and thereby effectively reduces the marginal 
costs of spending too. Thus, like a matching grant, it affects the local governments’ 
inefficiency decision by influencing the balance between marginal costs and benefits. 
The question then is how the Dutch style block grant compares to a matching grant in 
terms of efficiency.  
 
It is important to realize that the Dutch situation is quite different from that in, e.g., 
the US. Eligibility rules are centrally determined, giving local administrators very 
little leeway in determining whether someone is entitled to receive benefits. The same 
is true for benefit levels. Even if there is some leeway, and therefore some minor 
differences across municipalities, mobility is limited in the Netherlands, in particular 
for people on welfare. Low income households depend on subsidized housing, for 
which there are considerable waiting lists. Thus, poor people do not migrate to obtain 
better welfare benefits, and a race to the bottom does not occur. Instead, the country 
faced the opposite problem that too much money was spent on welfare. This was the 
very reason for introducing the new block grant system, giving municipalities greater 
financial responsibility for their welfare expenditures and providing incentives for 
them to both decrease inflow and increase outflow of welfare (Van Es and Van 
Vuuren, 2010; Kok et al., 2007).  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related 
literature in several fields. Section 3 presents more detailed information about the 
Dutch welfare grant allocation method. Section 4 describes and solves a model of the 
efficiency choice at the municipality level. Section 5 adds to this several types of 
grant allocation and studies their effects on efficiency. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
This paper is related to several strands of literature: those concerning welfare reform, 
intergovernmental grants, fiscal equalization, mechanism design, and yardstick 
competition. 
 
Analyses of welfare reforms often simultaneously deal with both a change in 
financing and a decentralization of discretion over welfare policy. 2  Moreover, 
empirical studies of the influence of financing arrangements typically do not 
discriminate between the effects on benefit levels, which do not concern us here, and 
on the number of recipients. An exception is Baicker (2005), who uses US data from 
1948 to 1963 to separately estimate the effect of the match rate of the federal grant on 
welfare benefits per recipient and on the number of welfare recipients. For the former, 
she found a price elasticity of around -0.4; for the latter, an elasticity of around -0.3. 
Thus, a matching grant results in a higher number of welfare beneficiaries than a 
block grant, which has a match rate of zero. 
 
That is in line with the traditional theory of intergovernmental grants, where the 
differential effects of matching grants and block or lump-sum grants have been 
discussed extensively (for a review, see, e.g., Wildasin, 1986; Oates, 1972, 1999; or 
Bird and Smart, 2002). The upshot of this theory is that a matching grant, by lowering 
the marginal cost of public services, has a greater stimulating effect on local spending 
than does a lump-sum grant of the same amount. Matching grants may be optimal if 
local decision making produces inefficient outcomes, e.g., in the case of externalities. 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Chernick (1998), Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) and Blank (2002) for the US welfare reform of 
1996, and Gilbert and Rocaboy (1996) for the 1994 reforms in France. 
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If that is not the case, unconditional block grants are the most efficient grants, as they 
do not distort local governments’ spending decisions.  
 
More recent studies of intergovernmental grants stress that this conclusion only holds 
under conditions of full information and unlimited capacity on the part of the central 
government to commit itself to grant policy. If local governments expect that the 
central government will bail them out ex post with extra grants, a moral hazard 
problem occurs, and local governments are likely to overspend (e.g., Goodspeed, 
2002). This soft budget constraint literature is closely related to the literature on 
decentralized leadership (e.g., Köthenbürger, 2004; Akai and Sato, 2008; Breuillé et 
al., 2010). In these studies, local jurisdictions make their taxing and spending 
decisions ex ante, and the central government decides on grant allocation ex post.  
 
In our model, however, there is no soft budget constraint, and the grant allocation 
system is determined ex ante. We do have asymmetric information, though. If local 
governments are to give assistance to anyone who is eligible according to centrally 
determined rules, and if benefit levels are determined centrally as well, local 
governments need sufficient revenues to pay out benefits. Exogenous determinants of 
welfare dependency (e.g., health, education, labor market) differ considerable 
between jurisdictions. The welfare block grant allocation should account for this. This 
touches upon the literature on fiscal equalization. In many countries, fiscal disparities 
are equalized to some extent through a system of intergovernmental grants. 3 
Equalization of spending needs requires quantifying them, which is notoriously 
difficult (Duncan and Smith, 1996). One of the techniques that may be employed is a 
regression of spending on cost determinants (Ladd, 1994; Bradbury and Zhao, 2009). 
This technique is used in the Netherlands to derive the welfare grant allocation 
formula. 
 
                                                 
3
 Equalization has been advocated on the grounds that it improves locational efficiency (Buchanan, 
1950, 1952; Buchanan and Goetz, 1972; Boadway and Flatters, 1982); on equity grounds (Le Grand, 
1975; Bramley, 1990); as an insurance against regional shocks (Bucovetsky, 1998; Von Hagen, 2006) 
and in order to improve transparency and thereby facilitate the local decision making process (Allers, 
2012). For a review of the arguments for equalization, see Boadway (2006). 
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However, asymmetric information limits the central government’s ability to design an 
optimal grant ex ante (e.g., Raff and Wilson, 1997; Cornes and Silva, 2002; Huber 
and Runkel, 2006; Breuillé and Gary-Bobo, 2007). Like these studies, we analyze a 
model where the central government cannot directly observe whether a local 
government has high or low costs. However, in our case, cost disparities among local 
governments can be estimated. This estimate is biased because local government 
efficiency levels are unobserved and thus omitted from the regression. As the grant 
allocation system provides an incentive to reduce inefficiency, this bias may decrease 
over time. Thus, our paper is related to the mechanism design literature, where, e.g., 
Riordan and Sappington (1988) and Strausz (2006) show that the informational rent 
earned by an agent can be reduced if more accurate information about that agent 
becomes available ex post. Akai and Silva (2009) also analyze a model where ex post 
information enables the center to improve the grant system, but, in their model, ex 
post information about cost levels is complete, whereas, in our model, it is biased. 
Moreover, their model includes soft budget constraints.  
 
A final related strand of literature concerns yardstick competition, an instrument to 
provide incentives for regulated monopolies (e.g., Shleifer, 1985). This instrument 
may be applied if the regulator does not know the minimal cost at which a firm can 
produce. Yardstick competition entails comparing similar regulated firms with each 
other. For any given firm, the regulator uses the costs of comparable firms to infer the 
attainable cost level. The regulator may use this information to let each firm compete 
with its own shadow firm. Thus, each firm has an incentive to lower costs as much as 
it can. Note that this requires that the regulator observes actual cost levels of firms. In 
our case, however, inefficiency is unobserved.4  
 
                                                 
4
 Another difference is that, in Shleifer’s model, firms maximize profits minus adjustment costs in a 
one-shot game, whereas in our model the maximization problem is more complicated. Also, in our 
model, the transfer or grant is more complicated than the equilibrium transfers derived by Shleifer. 
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3. Welfare finance in the Netherlands 
The territory of the Netherlands is divided into 441 (in 2009) local governments, or 
municipalities. Municipalities are responsible, among other things, for administering 
welfare. Eligibility rules and welfare benefit levels are uniform across the country. 
Until 2001, each municipality financed 10 percent of its welfare benefits from its own 
coffers, while 90 percent was reimbursed by the central government through an open-
ended matching grant. Clearly, this did not provide a strong incentive to limit welfare 
payments by helping recipients find work or by clamping down on fraud. In order to 
improve this incentive, the match rate was reduced from 90 to 75 percent in 2001. As 
from 2004, no reimbursement takes place any more. Matching grants have been 
replaced by block grants. If a municipality spends more than its block grant, it bears 
the extra expenditures itself (up to a point, see below). If it spends less, it may use the 
balance as it sees fit. Figure 1 summarizes the reform. The line AB indicates the 
hypothetical budget constraint without grants. By lowering the price of an additional 
beneficiary, the open-ended matching grant used before 2004 rotated the local budget 
constraint from AB to AC. The block grant used since 2004 shifts the budget 
constraint from AB to DE. DE is steeper than AC, reflecting the higher price of an 
additional welfare recipient.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In addition to benefit payments, municipalities also incur administrative costs. We 
define administrative costs as the costs of running a welfare program over and above 
the welfare benefit payments themselves. Administrative costs include, inter alia, the 
costs of establishing eligibility, of helping welfare recipients find a job (e.g., work 
programs), and of fraud investigations. Administrative costs are paid partially out of 
an earmarked block grant, and partially out of own resources.5 Own resources include 
                                                 
5
 Every municipality receives a block grant (“participatiebudget”) earmarked for helping unemployed 
persons find work, for integrating immigrants and for educating adults with insufficient schooling. The 
grant a municipality receives depends on the number of welfare recipients, the number of 
unemployment benefits, the size of the work force and an indicator for the availability of low-skilled 
jobs (Besluit participatiebudget, Annex 1; available – in Dutch – through www.overheid.nl). Although 
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a (considerable) equalizing unconditional lump-sum grant from the central 
government and (comparatively modest) local tax revenues. 
 
The new financing arrangement introduced in 2004 was accompanied by greater local 
autonomy in the treatment of welfare recipients. However, it is important to stress that 
this new autonomy is limited to administration. Local governments have discretion 
over the programs they employ to assist recipients in moving from welfare to work, 
and the intensity of their fraud investigations. Eligibility rules and welfare benefit 
levels are still uniform and determined centrally. This is an important difference with 
the 1996 welfare reform in the US. Municipal welfare expenditures6 can only be 
lowered by reducing caseloads. As assistance to the truly needy cannot be refused, 
caseloads can only be reduced by weeding out fraudulent beneficiaries and by helping 
bona fide recipients find work.  
 
The nationwide budget available for welfare block grants, referred to as the macro 
budget, is calculated annually based on forecasts of the number of persons eligible for 
welfare. These forecasts are made by the independent Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis, known by its Dutch acronym CPB.7 Forecasts are based 
on the number of welfare beneficiaries, the development of the number of 
unemployed in the previous years,8 and regulatory changes that may affect welfare 
volumes.  
 
The macro budget is allocated over municipalities according to the following rules. 
For small municipalities (fewer than 25,000 inhabitants, where 9 percent of welfare 
                                                                                                                                            
this grant increases when the number of welfare recipients goes up, the money is earmarked. Unlike the 
grant aimed at financing local welfare benefits, it cannot be used for other purposes. Therefore, we 
assume it does not enter the local government’s utility function, and we ignore this grant in the 
following sections. 
6
 In this paper, ‘welfare expenditures’ refers to welfare benefit payments only. That is, welfare 
expenditures do not include administrative costs. 
7
 See www.cpb.nl. 
8
 People losing their job normally are entitled to an unemployment benefit for a period which depends 
on their employment history. After this period, they may apply for a (usually lower) welfare benefit if 
they have insufficient means to support themselves and their families. 
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recipients live), the share of the macro budget in year t depends on their share of 
welfare expenditures in year t-2. For large municipalities (40,000 inhabitants and 
more, 80 percent of welfare recipients), a formula applies, which includes both 
demographic and labor market characteristics. The allocation formula is updated 
regularly. Because a formula that covers smaller municipalities reasonably well could 
not be derived, this method does not apply to them. For medium-sized municipalities, 
a hybrid system applies: their share is partly derived from their expenditure share in 
year t-2, and partly from the formula.  
 
It has proven difficult to derive a stable allocation formula. Municipalities may see 
their calculated share of the macro budget rise or fall considerably from one year to 
the next. In order to insulate local governments from budgetary shock too great to 
cope with, differences between the block grant and actual welfare expenditures are 
limited both ex post and ex ante. These limits are analyzed in Appendix B. 
 
Presently, the welfare grant allocation formula contains 14 variables.9 Among these 
are the number of single parent households, the number of lowly educated people, 
employment growth in the region to which the municipality belongs, and the number 
of disability benefits. The weights of these variables are derived annually10 from a 
regression at the municipal level of welfare expenditures on the determinants included 
in the formula.  
 
This approach is not without problems. That is because municipalities operate at 
different levels of efficiency. Actual welfare expenditures are a biased indicator of 
spending need, which is defined as the welfare spending a municipality would incur if 
it operated efficiently (as defined above). Greater efficiency in the past results in 
lower welfare expenditures, which translates into lower weights in the formula for the 
variables on which the municipality scores relatively high, and therefore into a lower 
grant. As a result, bad behavior in the past is rewarded. This provides perverse 
                                                 
9
 We describe the Dutch system as it existed in 2009. The grant allocation formula may be found in 
Annex 1 of Besluit WWB 2007, which is available (in Dutch) through www.overheid.nl.  
10
 In practice, the grant formula is left unchanged in some years. 
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incentives and distorts efficiency. However, the allocation formula is updated 
regularly, and policymakers expect that, as the new grant design improves efficiency 
across the board, this bias will gradually disappear. In the next two sections we will 
show that this is not to be expected. We do so by presenting a theoretical framework 
which describes the effects of different grant allocation methods on the local 
governments’ efficiency decision. 
4. Local governments’ efficiency decision 
In this section we focus on the choice of the efficiency level by the local authorities. 
As already explained, we interpret efficiency as implementing active labor market 
policies and fraud investigations in such a way that benefit payments are minimized: 
benefits are only given to those who really need it.11 For now, we use a very general 
function to describe the grant allocation method. We will turn to specific allocation 
methods in the next section. 
4.1. Model 
We assume that the efficiency decision is not only based on a local government’s 
expenditures on welfare and on grant allocation, but also on some ‘easy life function’, 
which describes the monetary equivalent of the utility that the local government’s 
administrators derive from working inefficiently. This utility may, e.g., take the form 
of political gains that may be derived from handing out benefits generously, or it may 
simply reflect the utility of leaning back and not exerting too much effort on work 
programs or enforcement. Furthermore, we assume that the local government takes 
into account how actual welfare expenditures will depend on the level of inefficiency. 
That is, although the central government does not observe the local governments’ 
inefficiency levels, the local government has full information. Finally, we impose a 
maximum inefficiency level,12 which should be interpreted as follows. Although the 
central government cannot observe the inefficiency level, it will notice when a local 
                                                 
11
 Thus, we ignore technical inefficiency. Many municipalities contract out programs to help welfare 
recipients find work to private firms which operate in more than one municipality. Therefore, this 
assumption does not seem to be unduly unrealistic there. 
12
 The assumption of a maximum inefficiency level does not qualitatively affect the results. It merely 
avoids the possibility of extreme inefficiency which does not seem to make sense in practice. 
 12 
government ‘misbehaves’ in an extreme way, and it will intervene and impose a 
severe punishment. 
 
As a benchmark we first consider the case of an open-ended matching grant. Suppose 
that the central government reimburses a share 1-α of a local government’s welfare 
payments, leaving only a share α to be paid out of the local government’s own 
resources. In addition, we assume that the local government also pays the 
administrative costs out of its own resources. This yields the following maximization 
problem for the local government under the matching grant, which is indicated by a 
subscript 0 denoting the benchmark situation:13 
 
(1)  
.                
   s.t.         


















Here, Z0 denotes the inefficiency level of the local government, Z0 ≥ 0 and greater Z0 
means greater inefficiency. The lower Z, the greater effort is exerted by the 
administrators to reduce welfare expenditures. Y0 denotes the local government’s 
welfare expenditures and is determined both by Z0 and by the exogenous spending 
need determinants X (a 1xn vector).14 We let X be time-independent for expositional 
convenience. In reality these variables may change over time, but they do so only 
gradually, and they cannot be influenced by the welfare administrators. C(Z0|X) is the 
administrative cost function15 with C(Z|X) ≥ 0, C′(Z|X) < 0, and C′′(Z|X) ≥ 0. L(Z0) is 
the easy life function with L′(Z) > 0, and L′′(Z) ≤ 0; Zmax is the maximum inefficiency 
level. Finally, α, β (an nx1 vector), and γ are parameters with γ > 0. Note that 1-α is 
the match rate of the welfare grant to the local government, with ]1,0[∈α .  
                                                 
13
 In this section, we focus on a single local government and therefore do not use an index to denote the 
identity of the authority. 
14
 In reality, past inefficiency levels may also play a role. When the administrator helps a person to find 
a job, he or she may still have that job next year, so the administrator continues to enjoy lower 
expenditures. We ignore this in the theoretical framework. 
15
 We use the notation C(Z0|X0) rather than C(Z0,X0) in order to simplify the notation of the derivative 
of C with respect to Z (writing C′), taking into account that X is an exogenous variable. 
 13 
 
In the analysis below, only the difference between the functions C and L (or between 
their derivatives) matters. Thus, mathematically, they play the same role and one 
could argue that one of the two is redundant. However, from an economics point of 
view, the two functions have distinct interpretations. Therefore, we choose to 
explicitly use both C and L below. 
 
The assumptions regarding the administrative cost function and the easy life function 
can be interpreted as follows: more inefficiency (higher Z) makes administrators’ 
lives easier, but it does so at a decreasing rate. More inefficiency also lowers 
administrative costs, e.g., because of less effort to help beneficiaries find work, but it 
does so at a decreasing rate. Note that we focus on a single period in this 
maximization problem. Including future periods in the objective function (as we do 
below) would not affect the solution for the problem under the matching grant, P0, 
however, and therefore we ignore those for expositional convenience.  
 
It is important to note that the central government can observe welfare expenditures Y 
and spending need determinants X, but not the inefficiency level Z. Also, the 
parameter β is not observed by the central government. Although X is assumed to be 
constant, the parameter β may change over time as macro-economic conditions vary. 
The central government cannot infer Z from the observables.  
Now consider a block grant system along the lines of the Dutch welfare reform. We 
use a time subscript t ≥ 1 because future periods do matter under this system. The 
block grant for year t depends on last year’s welfare expenditures of all local 
governments together and on macroeconomic variables, which together determine the 
macro budget, as well as on a grant allocation formula. Consequently, a local 
government can only influence the grant in year t via its inefficiency level in the 
previous year, Zt-1. The local government has to pay the full welfare expenditures out 
of the grant, supplemented with the local government’s own resources if necessary. 
Thus, there is no reimbursement anymore. Administrative costs and the easy life 
hypothesis remain as before. Thus, under the block grant system at time t ≥ 1, the 





,...1,                   
   s.t.         


























Here, we define ]1,0[∈δ  to be the discount factor. τB  represents the grant at time τ, 
where we assume 0)(' 1 ≥−ττ ZB . This assumption implies that inefficiency is rewarded 
by a larger grant in the next period. We also assume that the greater the local 
government, the larger the effect of its behavior on its future grant. Note that formally, 
τB  is a function of 1−τY , which itself is a function of 1−τZ . We simplify this by 
writing τB  as a function of 1−τZ . Also for simplicity, we assume that local 
governments differ only in their Z, X, and Y and B; not in their functions L and C or 
parameters α, β, γ, and δ. 
 
In this section, we thus use a general grant function Bτ, although we put some 
restrictions on it. With this very general allocation rule, we can already derive our 
main results. In Section 5 we will study the effects of specific allocation methods in 
more detail. These methods do satisfy (and indeed inspired) the restrictions on the 
function τB  in this section. For example, with a macro budget which is determined in 
part by previous welfare expenditures (see Section 5), higher inefficiency ceteris 
paribus implies a larger grant in the next period as a result of a larger macro budget 
(and, depending on the grant allocation system, possibly a larger share of the macro 
budget as well). Also, in such a setting, the extreme case of a very small (in terms of 
welfare expenditures) local government may have ,0)('1 ≈+ ττ ZB as its behavior may 
not affect its future grant, because it is too small to affect the macro budget or the 
budget shares. 
4.2. Solution 
In the benchmark case, under a matching grant, the local government solves the 
problem P0 in (1). This yields the first-order condition (FOC) 
 
(3) .)|(')(' 00 αγ=− XZCZL  
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Depending on the shapes of the functions L and C, this may of course yield a corner 
solution at either Z0 = 0 or Z0 = Zmax. We assume in the following that the FOC (3) has 
an interior solution denoted by Z0*. Note that Z0* depends on X via the administrative 
cost function. This implies that different local governments – that is, with different X 
– will choose different efficiency levels even if the functions C and L are the same 
across local governments. 
 
The solution is shown graphically in Figure 2. Figure 2 plots the difference between 
the derivatives of the easy-life function L and the administrative cost function C, 
assuming for simplicity that this difference L′-C′ is linear. Given our assumptions, L′-
C′ is positive and decreasing in Z. The Figure shows how to derive the equilibrium 
values of the inefficiency level Z. Under the benchmark matching grant, equilibrium 
occurs at the point where L′-C′ equals αγ , a constant. The corresponding equilibrium 
is illustrated by E0 in the Figure. In the extreme case of a match rate of one, 0=αγ , 
and equilibrium occurs at Zmax. With a fixed block grant, or without any grant, the 
match rate is zero, so γαγ = , and the local government chooses efficiency level Z** 
(E2 in Figure 1). Note that Z** is the lowest efficiency level that can be reached by 
changing the grant system. This equilibrium arises if local governments have no 
influence whatsoever over the grant they receive. For expositional convenience, and 
because perfect efficiency seems unlikely even in this case, we assume that Z** >0. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Under the block grant the local government solves the problem Pt in (2). The 
corresponding FOC is 
 
(4) ).(')|(')(' 1 tttt ZBXZCZL +−=− δγ  
 
This differs from the FOC of the benchmark model, (3), because now the match rate 
is zero (α=1) and there is a block grant Bt+1 which depends on Zt. Again, we assume 
an interior solution, and again the equilibrium efficiency level depends on the 
exogenous variables in the allocation formula, so different local governments (with 
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different X) will choose different efficiency levels even if the functions C and L are 
the same across local governments.  
4.3. Results 
Now consider what happens if a matching grant is replaced by a block grant. With a 
matching grant, the FOC (3) of the benchmark model shows how the local 
government balances marginal benefits and costs of inefficiency, i.e., of welfare 
spending. Marginal benefits consist of increased easy life and reduced administrative 
costs (left-hand side of FOC), and marginal costs are reflected by the increase in net-
of-grant welfare expenditures (right-hand side or RHS of FOC). Under the block grant, 
the FOC is given by (4). Again, the RHS can be interpreted as the marginal cost of 
inefficiency. It describes the effect of Zt on the local government’s welfare 
expenditures, γ, minus the present value of the budget increase in the next period. 
Together, this can again be interpreted as the effect on net-of-grant welfare 
expenditures. 
 
Comparing (3) and (4) reveals the following. First, a matching grant (α<1) reduces the 
costs of an extra welfare beneficiary from γ to αγ. That is, a matching grant decreases 
marginal costs of welfare spending – and thus of working inefficiently – and thereby 
affects the efficiency choice of local administrators, leading to a higher level of 
inefficiency. Second, the block grant as described above makes future grants depend 
on current inefficiency (via expenditures) and thereby reduces the marginal costs of 
spending as well, this time to ).('1 tt ZB +− δγ Essentially, in this case moral hazard 
arises because local governments have an incentive to reduce their efficiency in order 
to get a higher grant in the future. Thus, both the matching grant and the block grant 
with dependence on previous inefficiency affect the local governments’ inefficiency 
decision in a similar way: by influencing the balance between marginal costs and 
benefits of inefficiency. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how the block grant equilibrium Zt* compares to the benchmark 
matching grant equilibrium Z0*. At time t ≥ 1, the FOC (4) not only involves the 
functions L and C, but also the function 1+tB , where 0)('1 >+ tt ZB . Equilibrium is 
illustrated by E1 in the Figure. Note that although in Figure 2 we have drawn 
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)('1 tt ZB +−δγ  as a decreasing function of Zt, it could alternatively be increasing (or 
even nonmonotonic) depending on the sign of )(''1 tt ZB + .16 Using Figure 2 we obtain 
the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: Moving from a matching grant to a block grant may induce a local 
government to increase efficiency (Zt* < Z0*), depending on parameter values. 
 
Note however that, depending on the shapes of L′, C′, and '1+tB , and the values of the 
parameters α, γ, and δ, the equilibrium inefficiency level may in fact increase rather 
than decrease with the introduction of a block grant system. The FOC (4) associated 
with the new system can be rewritten as 
 
 .0)(')|(')(' 1 =+−− + tttt ZBXZCZL δγ  
 
We can evaluate the left-hand side of this FOC in the benchmark equilibrium 
inefficiency level Z0* (i.e., substituting the FOC (3) for time t=0) as  
 
 ( ){ }.' *01 ZBt+−− δγαγ  
 
As can also be seen from Figure 2, the inefficiency level Z will decrease relative to 
Z0* with the introduction of the new system if this expression is negative 
( ( ) αγδγ >− + *01 ' ZBt ), but it will increase instead if the expression is positive. The 
expression is increasing in α and δ and decreasing in γ. Thus, for the block grant 
system to indeed enhance efficiency, we need both the match rate under the old 
system (1-α) and the effect of a local government’s inefficiency on its welfare 
expenditures (γ) to be sufficiently large, and the discount factor (δ) to be sufficiently 
small. Also, since 0'1 ≥+tB , the function 1+tB  should not be too steep.  
 
                                                 
16
 Note that if X does depend on t then the curve L′-C′ would shift when we move from the matching 
grant equilibrium (E0) to the block grant equilibrium (t ≥ 1; E1 or E2) since in general C′ depends on X. 
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For smaller local jurisdictions, the effect of increased efficiency on the macro budget 
is smaller than for large jurisdictions. Therefore, increased efficiency will reduce their 
next period grant by a smaller amount (they face a less steep 1+tB  function). Therefore 
inefficiency levels are more likely to decrease for relatively small local governments 
(see also Section 5.1), and in general in settings with many local governments – since 
that implies that individual local governments will be smaller relative to the total 
welfare expenditures, at least on average. In the case of an extremely small local 
government, 0)('1 ≈+ tt ZB , and we end up in equilibrium E2 in Figure 2. 
 
Proposition 2: The efficiency boost from replacing a matching grant by a block grant 
will decrease with local government size.  
 
Thus, in this model, if parameter values are such that the introduction of a block grant 
decreases efficiency for some local governments, this will be the case for relatively 
large jurisdictions. Section 5.1 illustrates this. Of course, this result crucially depends 
on our assumption that a larger local government’s behavior has a stronger effect on 
its future grant. 
 
From inspection of the FOCs and Figure 2 it is also easy to derive the following result. 
 
Proposition 3: Under the block grant complete efficiency (Z=0) will not necessarily 
obtain, depending on parameter values. 
 
The most efficient grant is a fixed block grant, equivalent to a matching grant with α = 
1. With such a grant, equilibrium occurs at Z**, which is still higher than zero except 
when .  )|(')(' ttt ZXZCZL ∀−≥γ  So, in general, we have both less than perfect 
efficiency, and continuing disparities in efficiency across local governments.17 
 
                                                 
17
 Recall that size differences are not the only reason why inefficiency levels will differ across local 
governments. Efficiency levels are also determined by the exogenous variables X, via the 
administrative cost function C.  
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Due to the setup of our model, convergence to the new equilibrium after introduction 
of the new system is immediate. If the derivative '1+tB  does not depend on t, then the 
new equilibrium inefficiency level Zt* is in fact independent of t. However, if the 
derivative '1+tB  does depend on t (or, contrary to our assumption, we have time-
dependent exogenous spending need determinants Xt), the equilibrium inefficiency 
level Zt* induced by the new system is also time-dependent. Such dependence of '1+tB  
could for example be due to the fact that the macro budget and its response to an 
individual local government’s inefficiency level depend also on other local 
governments’ inefficiency levels. If this time-dependence of '1+tB  reduces over time, 
for example because inefficiency levels decrease, this could result in some kind of 
transition path towards a new equilibrium inefficiency level. 
 
The model can be extended to include possible loss aversion. The municipality’s 
objective function may put a greater weight on a deficit than on a surplus. We analyze 
this extension of the model in Appendix A. 
 
5. Grant allocation 
The function 1+tB  is part of the design of the welfare allocation model, and therefore 
can be influenced by the policy maker. We now turn to a discussion of the 
implications of some specific allocation models. 
We begin by considering a simple hypothetical system where every local 
government’s share in the macro budget is constant. Then we analyze two simplified 
systems which are based on the arrangement that is in place in the Netherlands, for 
small and large municipalities, respectively. First, we consider grant shares which 
equal previous expenditure shares. Second, we analyze a model where grant shares 
are based on a regression of welfare expenditures on exogenous variables reflecting 
spending need. For simplicity, we set the macro budget equal to total welfare 
expenditures in the previous period. In this section we index local governments by a 
subscript i, i=1,...,m. 
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5.1. Fixed shares 
Suppose that each local government receives a fixed share of the macro budget. By 
decreasing Zi, a local government receives the benefits of greater efficiency while 
sharing the cost in terms of a reduced grant in the next period (resulting from a lower 
macro budget) with all other local governments.  
 









tiiti YB θ  
 
where θi is the fixed share of local government i in the macro budget. The θi’s are 














iii YYθ  Note that if a local government increases its expenditures by one 
euro, its grant for next year increases by θi ≤ 1 euros. We now have γθititi ZB =+ )(' ,1, , 
and the FOC (4) becomes  
 
 ).1()|(')('
,, iititi XZCZL δθγ −=−  
 
Recall that the right-hand side (RHS) of the FOC was equal to αγ with a matching 
grant (FOC (3)). Now it is again a constant and local government i increases 
efficiency after the introduction of the block grant system if and only if ,1 αδθ >− i  
or, equivalently, .1 αδθ −<i  Here, iδθ  is the present value of the grant increase in the 
following year resulting from spending one additional euro on welfare under the fixed 
shares block grant system, while α−1  represents the grant increase resulting from 
spending one additional euro on welfare under the matching grant system. 
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Proposition 4: A block grant with fixed shares θi entails .)(' ,1, γθ ititi ZB =+  This block 
grant is more efficient than a matching grant if and only if .1 αδθ −<i  This is more 
likely for local governments with a low share θi of the macro budget. 
 
This clearly illustrates the result presented in Section 4 that, ceteris paribus, large 
local governments (those with greater θi, for example due to their large share in 
historical welfare expenditures) will have greater inefficiency under the block grant 
system. Large local governments therefore are more likely than small local 
governments to decide to increase rather than decrease their inefficiency level after 
the introduction of the block grant (Proposition 2). 
5.2. Grant based on previous period share 
Now suppose that the grant share depends on a local government’s share in welfare 







tititi YYθ  In this case, Bi,t 
depends on Zi,t-1 not only because Zi,t-1 influences the macro budget, but also because 
it now influences the local government’s share of the macro budget. 
 
Substituting the expression for θi,t into the expression for the grant of local 
government i, (5), immediately yields Bi,t = Yi,t-1. Given our assumption about the 
determination of the macro budget (i.e., the macro budget equals total welfare 
expenditures in the previous period), a local government’s grant for year t simply 
equals its expenditures in the year before. Thus, each euro of expenditures directly 
translates into one euro grant for next year. This implies γ=+ )(' ,1, titi ZB . Note that 
with fixed shares (the previous subsection) this derivative is multiplied by the share θi, 
which will in general be small. Thus, this derivative is much larger with grants based 
on the previous period’s share than it is with fixed shares. The right-hand side of the 
FOC (4) now equals (1-δ)γ and is much smaller than with fixed shares, implying that 
we now have far greater Zi,t in equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5: With previous period shares we have γ=+ )(' ,1, titi ZB  and the block 
grant system is more efficient than a matching grant if and only if .1 αδ −<  This is 
much less likely than with fixed shares. 
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This result is easily understood. In the condition ,1 αδ −<  the δ represents the 
present value of the grant increase in the following year resulting from spending one 
additional euro on welfare under the fixed shares block grant system, while α−1  
represents the grant increase resulting from spending one additional euro on welfare 
under the matching grant system. 
 
5.3. Grant based on regression 
If block grants are used but equity is a concern, past expenditures are probably not the 
best instrument to improve equity. With exogenous spending need determinants 
observable to all parties, econometric techniques allow forecasting future spending 
needs and allocating the available budget accordingly. We now consider such a 
sophisticated method where grant shares are derived from a regression of welfare 
expenditures on exogenous spending need determinants. There is, however, one 
problem with this method. As reflected in the model from the previous subsection, 
there is an additional explanatory variable, inefficiency, which cannot be observed. In 
practice, this variable is ignored when forecasting spending need. Below we analyze 
how this omitted variable problem affects grant shares and efficiency. 
 
In order to formalize this, we first consider the ‘true model’ relating Y to X,  
 
(6) ,ttt ZXY µγβ ++=  
 
using matrix notation. Here, Yt, Zt and µt are mx1 vectors, with m the number of local 
jurisdictions, X is an mxn matrix with n the number of exogenous spending need 
determinants, and β (nx1) and γ (scalar) are parameters. This is the same equation 
relating Y to X and Z as before, see (1), but now with an i.i.d. disturbance term added 
(we assume that 0=tEµ ). For a truly fair grant allocation, one would need to know 
the parameter β. However, since Zt is unobservable, β cannot be estimated. The 
regression model used is therefore an approximation:  
 
(7) ,tt XY εϕ +=  
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assuming that the disturbance term is i.i.d. with 0=tEε .
18
 Clearly, the estimate ϕˆ  
which results from this estimation is a biased estimate of β, unless X and Zt are 
orthogonal, which is highly unlikely. 19 
 
The model (7) is re-estimated every year, so the estimate of φ changes annually . This 
is indicated by a subscript t. The estimate for φ calculated at time t is given by  
 
 tt YXXX ')'(ˆ 1−=ϕ , 
 
with tϕˆ  an nx1 vector. The grant for next year is given by  
 
 ,ˆ1 tt XB ϕ=+  
 
where Bt+1 is an mx1 vector. Thus, the grant equals the predicted welfare expenses tYˆ  
according to the regression model (7). Here, we ignore the effect of Z on the size of 
the macro budget.20 Note that the grant received by local government i at time t+1 
thus depends not only on Xi, but on both spending need determinants X and 
inefficiency levels Z at time t of all local governments.  
 
In order to determine the effect of the allocation model on the equilibrium 
inefficiency level Zt* we need to analyze the relevant FOC. This is similar to the FOC 
(4) we derived for the problem Pt in Section 4.2. In matrix notation, with some abuse 
of notation, we now have 
                                                 
18
 We assume for simplicity that the regression model includes the correct set of exogenous variables Xj, 
j=1,...,n. 
19
 Orthogonal is not the same as uncorrelated. Orthogonal means that the scalar product (or inner 
product) is 0; uncorrelated means that the scalar product of the vectors’ centered (mean corrected) 
forms is 0. This is the same if both vectors are centered and have mean zero, which is not the case here. 
20
 We ignore the fact that the predicted expenses may not sum to exactly the same amount as the actual 
expenses. Including this would imply scaling, i.e. multiplying each element of the vector Bt+1 by the 
same number, which is determined exogenous of the model. 
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(8) ).()|()( 1 tdttdtd ZBXZCZL +−=− δγι  
 
Here, Ld, Cd and Bd are mx1 vectors. The superscript d denotes the derivative with 
respect to the variable between brackets. E.g., the i-th element of Ld is the derivative 
of L with respect to Z, evaluated in Zi,t, and the i-th element of )(1 tdt ZB +  is the 
derivative of 1, +tiB  with respect to Zi,t. The variable ι  is an mx1 vector of ones.  
 
Thus, we need to take the derivative of the grant Bi,t+1 with respect to Zi,t (for each 
local government i). In the expression for Bi,t+1, Zi,t enters only via tϕˆ , and in the 
expression for tϕˆ  itself Zi,t enters only via Yi,t. In order to obtain the derivative of Bi,t+1 
with respect to Zi,t, note that the derivative of the vector Yt with respect to Zi,t is a 
vector which has zeros everywhere except for the i-th element, which equals γ. Thus, 
the derivative of tϕˆ  with respect to Zi,t equals γ times the i-th column of the matrix 
')'( 1XXX − , and the derivative of Bi,t+1 with respect to Zi,t equals the i-th row of X 




Proposition 6: With the regression method we have 
[ ] iiiitidti hXXXXZB γγ ≡= −+ ')'()( 1,1,  and the block grant system increases efficiency if 
and only if .1 αδ −<iih  
 
How can this result be interpreted? First note that the effect of increased efficiency of 
local government i on its next period’s grant depends not only on its own exogenous 
spending need determinants Xi, but also on those of the other local governments. 
However, the derivative does not depend on (any) inefficiency levels.  
 
We can also see from Proposition 6 that local government i’s grant Bi,t+1 reacts 
strongly to its inefficiency level Zi,t if (and only if) hii, the i-th diagonal element of 
')'( 1XXXX − , is large (in absolute value). The matrix ')'( 1XXXX −  is known as the 




, given the regression equation (7): ttt YXXXXXY ')'(ˆˆ 1−== ϕ . The diagonal 
elements of this hat matrix, hii, can be interpreted as leverages. They describe the 
influence of an observation on the predicted value for that observation. A high value 
of hii means that the observation Yi,t is influential in determining tiY ,ˆ . It is well known 
(e.g., Hoaglin and Welsch, 1978) that 0 ≤ hii ≤ 1, and that the average value equals 
n/m, where n is the number of parameters (here: exogenous spending need 
determinants) and m the number of observations (here: local jurisdictions). Clearly, if 
tiY ,
ˆ
 is determined to a relatively large extent by Yi,t, then the grant Bi,t+1 is determined 
to a relatively large extent by Zi,t. Again, the inequality in the proposition compares 
the present value of the eventual block grant increase resulting from spending an 
additional euro on welfare, ,iihδ to the grant increase due to spending one more euro 
when a matching grant is in place ( α−1 ). 
 






d hXZCZL δγ −=−  
 
As we assume that parameters γ and δ do not differ between local governments, the 
RHS of the FOC is constant. Local government i increases efficiency (i.e., Zi,t*< Zi,0*) 
after the introduction of the new system if and only if .1 αδ −<iih  This is particularly 
likely to be the case if α and δ are small, and the observation Yi,t is not too influential 
(hii is small, which is generally the case if m >> n). Recall that with a fixed block 
grant, the RHS of the FOC, representing the marginal costs from welfare spending, 
would equal γ. The regression-based allocation system yields lower marginal costs 
because of adjustments deemed necessary out of equity concerns. 
 
We now turn to the effects of the omitted variable problem. The effect of inefficiency 
on next period’s grant, )(1 tdt ZB + , turns out to be independent of t (see Proposition 6). 
The specification of our model results in immediate transition to the new equilibrium 
efficiency level. In the real world, transition will not be immediate. Nevertheless, to 
be truly equitable it is desirable that the regression model (7) will converge to the true 
model (6) as local governments start working more efficiently as a result of the 
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incentives inherent in the block grant system. Thus, for the regression method to work 
well, the estimated parameter tϕˆ  should converge to the true parameter β, and the 
grant B should converge to the ‘fair’ grant Xβ, at least in expected value. The 


































Thus, the expected value of the grant at time t+1 equals the fair grant Xβ plus an 
additional term, ,')'( 1 γtZXXXX − which depends on both spending need 
determinants and efficiency levels in all jurisdictions.  
 
Proposition 7: Due to the omitted variable problem, under the regression method the 
estimated model does not converge to the true model, and the expected grant does not 
converge to the fair grant. 
 
It is well known that the omitted variable problem affects the expected value of the 
estimated parameter ( tϕˆ ), but not its variance. The omitted variable bias is given by21 
γβϕ tt ZXXXE ')'(ˆ 1−=− . We have multiple regressors in X, and even if one of 
those is uncorrelated with Zt, its estimate will be biased unless the regressor is 
uncorrelated with all other regressors too. In the current setting it seems reasonable to 
assume that the regressors are all correlated, so all estimates (all elements of the 
vector tϕˆ ) are biased. The bias is nonzero except in the special case where Zt = 0, or 
where X′Zt is a vector of zero’s, i.e., X and Z are orthogonal. The first case, Zt = 0, 
implies complete efficiency in all jurisdictions, which is highly unlikely. The second 
case is highly unlikely mathematically, as in our model Zt is determined by the FOC 
(9) as a function of X. Thus, convergence of the grant B to the fair grant Xβ is highly 
                                                 
21
 Note that this bias equals γ times the slope from regressing Zt on X. 
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unlikely. It is difficult to sign the omitted variable bias. Since all regressors in X can 
be pairwise correlated, it is next to impossible to obtain the direction of the biases. 
5.4. Grant comparison 
The first order condition describing the local government’s efficiency choice sets the 
marginal benefit of welfare spending, ),|(')('
,,
XZCZL titi −  equal to the marginal 
cost, i.e., net-of-grant welfare expenditures. Table 1 summarizes marginal costs for 
different grants, as derived above. They are constant for all grant types we study: they 
do not depend on the inefficiency level Zi,t, but for some grant types they are different 
for municipalities with different values of budget share θi or leverage hii. In a Figure 
similar to Figure 2, the various marginal cost levels shown in Table 1 would be 
represented by horizontal lines. The inefficiency level Zi,t a municipality chooses 
decreases with increasing marginal cost of welfare spending, because higher marginal 
costs increase the incentive to work efficiently. 
 
Whether a block grant gives municipalities a bigger incentive to work efficiently than 
a matching grant depends on parameter values. However, given that  ∈ 0,1 and 
	 ∈ 0,1 , Table 1 shows that a previous period shares block grant gives a smaller 
efficiency incentive than block grant where shares are fixed or regression-based, 
except in extreme cases. 
 
Table 1. Marginal cost of welfare spending under different grants (RHS of FOC)
 
Grant type Marginal cost of welfare spending 




Fixed shares block grant 1  
 
Previous period shares block grant 1  
 
Regression-based block grant 1  	
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the efficiency effects of replacing a matching grant with a block 
grant. It shows that the fixed shares block grant is more efficient than the matching 
grant if   ∝

.	 The intuition behind this is straightforward. Efficiency improves if a 
local government’s increase in welfare expenditures by one euro results in a smaller 
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grant increase under the block grant system than under the matching grant system. 
With a matching grant, spending an additional euro results in 1 – α of extra grant 
money. Spending one additional euro under a fixed shares block grant results in θi 
euro extra next year. The present value of that is δθi. So, the fixed shares block grant 
is more efficient than the matching grant if   1∝,		 or  
∝

.	 Note that the 
denominator reflects the increase in next year’s grant resulting from spending more 
under a fixed shares block grant. With a previous period shares block grant, spending 
one additional euro results in one euro in extra grant money next year. Now, the 
denominator becomes one, and the previous period shares block grant is more 
efficient than the matching grant if   1∝. With regression-based shares, spending 
an additional euro results in hii euro in extra grant money next year, and the 
regression-based block grant is more efficient than the matching grant if   ∝

. 
Table 2 also includes two numerical examples to be discussed in the next subsection. 
 




if and only if 







δ < 397 
(for average θi) 
δ < 7.5 
(for the highest θi) 
δ < 331 
(for average θi) 
δ < 6.25 
(for the highest θi) 
Previous 
period shares 
  1∝ 
(Proposition 5) 

















(average 	:   11) 
 
In general, replacing a matching grant with a block grant improves efficiency if α and 
δ are sufficiently small. For a fixed shares block grant, efficiency additionally requires 
small θi, and for a regression-based grant, efficiency additionally requires small hii. 
The latter implies m >> n, or many jurisdictions and relatively few exogenous welfare 
spending need determinants. Policymakers can increase block grant efficiency by 
increasing the time lag between local governments’ spending behavior and the 
resulting effect on grant size, e.g. using data for year t–k instead of t-1 for the 
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regression analysis, where k is an integer denoting the lag, k>1. Effectively, this 
replaces δ with δk<δ.  
5.5. Application to the Netherlands 
We now apply our results to the Dutch case. In the Netherlands, local governments 
originally received an open-ended matching grant to finance welfare spending, as 
described by the benchmark model above, with α = 0.25.22 In 2004, this was replaced 
by a system of block grants.  
 
First, we compare the matching grant with a block grant where the shares θi in the 
macro budget for different local jurisdictions are fixed. In the Netherlands, the 
average value of θi equals 0.002.23 According to Table 2, introducing a block grant 
with fixed shares increases efficiency in a municipality with an average value of θi if δ 
< 331, which is easily satisfied – recall that in our model, ]1,0[∈δ . Still, the incentive 
to increase efficiency could be small in very big municipalities. The maximum value 
of θi is 0.12 (for Amsterdam). Thus, an efficiency increase in all, including the biggest, 
municipalities implies δ < 6.25. Assuming δ = 0.95, introducing a fixed shares block 
grant increases efficiency in every municipality if , 79.0 ii ∀<θ  which will normally 
be the case. With high values of α, however, it is conceivable that introducing a block 
grant actually decreases efficiency in some large municipalities. For the Netherlands, 
this would require α ≥ 0.89 (again using θi = 0.12 for Amsterdam), which is much 
higher than it has ever been. Thus, we can conclude that replacing the matching grant 
that existed in the Netherlands with a block grant with fixed shares would have 
increased efficiency in all municipalities. Such a block grant was not introduced, 
however. 
 
Now consider previous period shares. Since 2004, the grant share of small 
municipalities in the Netherlands (< 25,000 inhabitants, where 9 percent of welfare 
recipients reside), depends on their share in welfare expenditures at t-2. The grant we 
                                                 
22
 In 2001 - 2003. Until 2001, α = 0.10. We will not discuss this case in the text; results are given in 
Table 2. 
23
 Calculated as  1/441, where 441 is the number of municipalities. 
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analyze in section 5.2 is based on the expenditure share in t-1 rather than t-2. 
Therefore, the actual effect of the Dutch grant system for small municipalities does 
not follow directly from Table 2. Also, the previous period shares system does not 
apply to large municipalities. If we nevertheless apply our results to the Dutch case, 
we find the following. Municipality i increases efficiency if a matching grant is 
replaced by a grant based on previous expenditure shares if and only if   1∝. With 
α equaling 0.25 before the matching grant was replaced, this requires a discount factor 
δ < 0.75, which seems implausibly low. Even considering that the Dutch grant is 
actually based on the expenditure share in t-2 rather than t-1, so that we should use δ2 
instead of δ, this requires a low discount factor (δ < 0.87). Thus, the new grant may 
have reduced efficiency for small municipalities. However, as large municipalities do 
have an incentive to reduce welfare dependency (see next paragraph), there is a 
downward pressure on the macro budget. As a result, for small municipalities, 
spending one additional euro actually results in less than one euro in extra grant 
money two years later. This improves their efficiency incentive somewhat. 
 
For large municipalities (≥ 40,000 inhabitants, where about 80 percent of welfare 
recipients live), regression-based grant allocation applies.24 Policymakers implicitly 
assume that the estimated model converges to the true model as local governments 
start working more efficiently. Proposition 7 states that this is not to be expected. 
Although this method may well increase efficiency relative to the old matching grant 
system, full efficiency is unlikely to obtain and the expected grant will remain biased.  
For a Dutch municipality with an average value of hii (which is 0.07), 25  the 
regression-based grant is more efficient than the matching grant if δ  ∝
.
 (Table 2). 
With α = 0.25 this implies δ < 11. As δ ∈ 0,1 the average municipality has increased 
efficiency. However, some municipalities may have disproportionate influence on 
                                                 
24
 The grant of medium sized municipalities is determined partly by their share in the previous period, 
and partly by regression results. The importance of both components depends on the number of 
inhabitants: with increasing size, regression results increase in importance. 
25
 In 2009. Calculated as n, the number of exogenous spending need determinants (14), divided by m, 
the number of large and medium sized municipalities (205). 
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their estimated welfare expenditures. With a reasonably safe value of 0.95 for δ,26 
efficiency requires hii < 0.79, which only doesn’t hold for extreme outliers (recall 0 ≤ 
hii ≤ 1).27 For the extreme case where hii = 1, the regression-based grant is equal to the 
previous period shares block grant, and the efficiency condition is the same as well 
(see Table 2).  
 
We can conclude that, according to our model, replacing the matching grant with a 
regression-based block grant in the Netherlands has increased efficiency in all 
municipalities concerned. This is in line with empirical evidence. Preliminary 
estimates of the effect of the introduction of block grants on the number of welfare 
recipients point to a reduction between 8 (Van Es and Van Vuuren, 2010) and 15 
percent (Kok et al., 2007). However, the introduction of the previous period block 
grant for small municipalities may have reduced efficiency there.  
 
Our modeling framework allows for a theoretical analysis of another aspect of the 
Dutch system. In the Netherlands, a municipality’s grant is not allowed to deviate too 
much from actual welfare expenditures. We extend our model in this direction in 
Appendix B. Overall, the results for the equilibrium inefficiency level are ambiguous, 
but numerical simulations indicate that the ex ante limit may well increase 
inefficiency by limiting the marginal cost of spending. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the use of regression-based block grants for a welfare system 
with decentralized administration but centralized financing. With uniform benefits 
and eligibility rules, welfare grants from the central government to local jurisdictions 
should be designed in such a way that they provide local governments with the right 
incentives to work efficiently, that is, give benefits only to those who really need it. 
                                                 
26
 Note that as it takes time for data to become available and for regression analyses to be carried out, 
the time lag in the Netherlands is usually bigger than one year (2-3 years). As a result, we are actually 
assuming here that δ2 or δ3 is 0.95, which is rather on the safe side. 
27
 As a rule of thumb in regression analysis, values exceeding two or three times the average value of 
hii (here: 0.14 or 0.21) are considered influential outliers that merit close inspection, and, possibly, 
exclusion from the analysis (e.g., Hoaglin and Welsch, 1978). 
 32 
Block grants are preferred over matching grants because of their efficiency, but they 
usually have the disadvantage of being less equitable. Such grants may be 
insufficiently low for local jurisdictions with high exogenous welfare spending needs. 
In this paper we consider a block grant allocation system which tries to avoid this 
disadvantage by letting grants depend on expected spending need. Such grants were 
introduced in the Netherlands in 2004. 
 
Dutch policymakers use econometric techniques to forecast future spending needs 
from a regression of welfare expenditures on observable exogenous spending need 
determinants. With grant shares derived from such a regression, a block grant should 
ensure that local governments that operate reasonably efficiently will not need to use 
own resources to finance welfare expenditures. Because total grants add up to no 
more than forecasted aggregated welfare expenditures, excess spending is discouraged. 
In this way, the Dutch aim to enjoy the benefits of block grants (efficiency), without 
the disadvantage associated with them (inequity). However, since inefficiency is not 
observed, the regression has an omitted variable problem and thereby a bias. We 
derive the size of this bias. In contrast to what policymakers claim, we show that in 
our simplified setting the regression model does not converge to the true model and 
the grant does not converge to the fair grant due to the omitted variable bias. 
 
A second problem with the regression method is that it gives rise to perverse 
incentives. Matching grants reduce the marginal cost of welfare spending and thereby 
increase the attractiveness of working inefficiently. Standard block grants do not have 
this property. However, the regression-based block grants discussed here have the 
property that higher expenditures increase future grants. This provides perverse 
incentives to local administrators by lowering the marginal net-of-grant costs of 
welfare spending. We show that full efficiency is not likely to obtain with a 
regression-based block grant. In extreme cases, efficiency may be even lower than 
under a matching grant system for relatively large local governments, for which 
expenditures usually have a greater effect on future grants than for small ones. So, in 
general, this type of block grant will result both in less than perfect efficiency, and in 
continuing disparities in efficiency across local governments of different size. 
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We analyze the efficiency results of replacing a matching grant with a regression-
based block grant, and with two alternative block grants. We conclude from our 
model that the introduction of regression-based grants in large Dutch municipalities 
has improved efficiency there. The reason is that with many local jurisdictions 
relative to the number of exogenous spending need determinants, the perverse 
incentive turns out to be small. However, our analysis suggests that the introduction 
of a block grant with shares depending on previous period shares in small Dutch 
municipalities may have decreased efficiency, whereas a block grant with fixed shares 
would have had the opposite effect.  
 
We conclude that the Dutch style regression-based block grant may be successfully 
applied by countries wishing to combine local administration, central financing, and 
efficient administration of welfare, while ensuring uniform eligibility and benefit 
levels and an equitable welfare burden for local jurisdictions. The method may also be 
applied to other programs. Our analysis shows under which conditions such 
regression-based grants may improve efficiency. 
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Appendix A: A penalty on deficits 
Contrary to our assumption so far, it is conceivable that the local government’s 
objective function puts a greater weight on a welfare deficit (Yt > Bt) than on a surplus. 
Van Es and Van Vuuren (2010) provide evidence that such an asymmetry prevails for 
welfare financing in Dutch municipalities. The reason could be that the municipality 
has a decision maker – say, the alderman for social services – who is in charge of 
welfare administration, and who maximizes his own objective function. This objective 
function takes into account that as long as there is some excess budget, the decision 
maker can (to some extent) go his own sweet way. However, if there is a deficit, the 
other aldermen will be involved. The deficit may, e.g., lead to a – politically painful – 
tax increase. A large deficit may even force a local government to reduce welfare 
spending, because such a deficit is difficult to finance. Our basic model does not 
account for this. There, welfare spending depends on the marginal costs and benefits, 
which are independent of the deficit or surplus on welfare finance. That may not be 
realistic. Indeed, in the Dutch case, if large municipalities reduce welfare spending 
because of the incentives inherent in the regression-based grant allocation, the grants 
to small municipalities will decrease because of a lower macro budget. This may force 
them to reduce welfare spending too. 
 
Consider an individual municipality and ignore the subscript i for simplicity. The 
objective function for problem Pt, equation (2), now becomes  
 









τδ )()|()( 1  
 
where Λ(x) is an increasing, continuously differentiable function with Λ(0)=0 and 
which is steeper for negative values of x than for positive values. For example, we 
could let Λ(x) be defined as follows: 2)2/1(4/1)( −−=Λ xx  for x < 0 and Λ(x) = x 
for x ≥ 0. Now, monetary costs and benefits are weighed more heavily in case of a 
deficit, while the weight of the non-monetary benefit L remains the same.  
 
The FOC (4) now becomes 
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where Λ′t(·) denotes the derivative of the function Λ evaluated in
)|()( 1 XZCYZB tttt −−− . This equation is difficult to solve for Zt. However, we can 
observe the following. The term Λ′t(·) depends on Zt but also on Zt-1. This implies that 
we can no longer solve for Zt independent of time. Instead, there will be some sort of 
adjustment process.  
 
Suppose that for x ≥ 0 we have Λ(x) = x, so Λ’(x) = 1, as before. In this case, it can 
easily be seen from the FOC that the penalty on deficits has two effects. First, if there 
is a deficit at time t, money in this period has a greater weight in the objective 
function. This, however, applies both to the cost term C and to the expenditure Y. The 
overall effect on Zt is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of C’ and γ, as the 
FOC shows. If spending an additional euro on administrative costs (fraud prevention, 
active labor market policy) results in a welfare spending decrease bigger than one 
euro, getting in deficit will give an incentive to improve efficiency. In this case, a 
lower macro budget because of efficiency improvements elsewhere could give a 
municipality an (extra) incentive to work more efficiently. 
 
Second, if there is going to be a deficit at time t+1, that period’s budget has a greater 
weight in the objective function. The municipality will respond by choosing higher 
inefficiency at time t in order to avoid a low budget in the next period. In fact, even in 
case of excess budget the decision maker has less of an incentive to increase 
efficiency, because this reduces his future grant and thereby may increase the 
likelihood of future deficits. 
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Appendix B: Upper bounds on deficits and surpluses  
 
As mentioned in Section 3, in order to insulate local governments from budgetary 
shock too great to cope with, in the Netherlands the difference between the block 
grant and actual welfare expenditures is limited both ex post and ex ante. The ex post 
limit fixes the upper limit of the (positive) difference between actual welfare 
expenditures and the block grant allocated to a municipality in the same year. If, at the 
end of the year, welfare expenditures turn out to exceed the grant by an amount of 
more than 10 percent of expenditures, the municipality receives additional funding ex 
post which finances the additional deficit. This ex post deficit limit affects roughly 
two dozen (out of 441) municipalities. 28  In practice, the ex ante limit is more 
important. It has been binding for more than half of all municipalities every year since 
the introduction of the new grant system. Differences (in absolute value) between the 
grant allocated to a municipality and welfare expenditures in year t-2 are subject to an 
upper limit ex ante of 7.5 percent of welfare expenditures. As of 2009, structural 
deficits (at least 2.5 percent during three consecutive years) are subject to an upper 
limit ex post too. 
Ex post deficit limit 
The ex post deficit limit fixed the upper limit of the (positive) difference between 
actual welfare expenditures and the block grant allocated to a municipality in the 










                                                 
28
 In 2007 – 2011, this number increased considerably; in 2009, 171 municipalities were affected. In 
this period, the macro budget was not adapted annually as described in section 3. Instead, the 
municipalities had agreed to bear the risk of increasing welfare expenditures themselves. With 
hindsight, this rather unfortunately coincided with a severe economic downturn. As from 2012, the 
mechanism described in section 3 is in place again. 
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Here, )1,0(∈pω  (recall that in the Netherlands, ωp = 0.1). This means that if, at the 
end of the year, welfare expenditures turn out to exceed the grant by an amount of 
more than 100ωp percent of the grant, the municipality can apply for additional 
funding ex post which finances the deficit in excess of ωpBt. However, this additional 
funding is granted only if the deficit cannot be blamed on local administrators.29  
 
With this restriction, the objective function for problem Pt, (2), becomes  
 








τ ωδ  
 
This implies that the FOC (4) may now change: the RHS may change during some 
periods, depending on whether or not the restriction is binding at time t or t+1 (or 
both). Thus, we can distinguish two possible effects of the restriction. Clearly, at any 
point in time, one, both or neither of these effects may occur. 
 
First, if the restriction is binding (only) at time t, the term γ drops out of the FOC (4). 
Equilibrium in Figure 2 is at the intersection with the curve )('1 tt ZB +−δ , which is 
below )('1 tt ZB +− δγ  as γ>0. This indicates that the municipality will now choose 
higher Zt. The intuition for this effect is as follows. Higher inefficiency means higher 
welfare expenditures, but now at some point this implies no additional own 
expenditures, as the match rate jumps from zero to one as soon as the restriction kicks 
in.  
 
The ex post limit does not apply if the deficit is a result of the local government’s own 
policy. However, a municipality may expect a weak local labor market which is likely 
to lead to a deficit exceeding 100ωp percent of the grant in the following year. If (and 
only if) the restriction is binding at time t+1, the term )('1 tt ZB +−δ  vanishes from the 
FOC (4). Equilibrium in Figure 2 is at point E2 instead of E1. Intuitively, higher 
                                                 
29
 In the Netherlands, an independent commission investigates whether a municipality’s own policies 
have caused the deficit. In that case, it must bear the deficit itself. 
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efficiency (lower Zt) normally results in a lower grant for the next period, but if the 
grant is supplemented to cover additional welfare expenditures anyway, this negative 
effect of greater efficiency drops out. In this case, lowering Zt does not reduce next 
year’s grant anymore. Thus, the municipality would choose lower Zt, but only to the 
extent that the restriction is still binding at time t+1. 
 
So, on the one hand, the upper bound for the deficit may limit the cost of working 
inefficiently (in terms of welfare expenditures paid out of own resources). On the 
other hand, however, it may take away part of the problem that municipalities are 
reluctant to increase efficiency because this lowers their grant in the next period.  
Ex ante limit 
In the Netherlands, the ex ante limit applies to medium-sized and large municipalities, 
for which the grant Bt is determined (at least in part) by the regression method. The 
idea behind it is that the difference between the grant Bt and a (hypothetical) grant 
based on expenses in the previous year (equal to Yt-1, see Section 5.2) should not be 
too large. Thus, the ex ante limit effectively fixes the upper limit of the difference (in 
absolute value) between the grant Bt allocated to a municipality and welfare 













Again, this condition puts an additional restriction on the variables for the 
maximization problem (2). However, the effect on the equilibrium efficiency level Zt* 
is more difficult to assess than in the case of the ex post limit.  
 
The objective function for problem Pt (equation (2)) can now be written as  
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 In the Netherlands, ωa = 0.075. To be precise, the Dutch system compares the grant to expenditures 








































If the ex ante limit is binding, the FOC (4) is affected. The ex ante limit may be 
binding as a result of an exogenous shock, but may also become binding as a result of 
the municipality’s own policy (choice of Zt). This seriously complicates the analysis 
and prevents us from deriving general results on the effects of the ex ante limit on 
efficiency. For example, the inefficiency level Zt that a municipality would want to 
choose without the ex ante limit might be such that the ex ante limit applies. But then 
the municipality might want to adjust Zt to avoid this (for example, the municipality 
may want to avoid that its grant Bt+1 is subject to a maximum). Or alternatively, a 
municipality might want to adjust its inefficiency level Zt-1 to make the ex ante limit 
apply at time t+1 (for example, to force a lower bound on its grant). This yields many 
possibilities and it is virtually impossible to compare all of those. In the remainder of 
this appendix we therefore focus on how the constraint affects the FOC and thereby 
efficiency, taking as given that it is binding. The idea behind this approach is that in 
this way at least we can obtain some impression of the possible effect on efficiency of 
this ex ante limit, assuming that it will be binding sometimes. Recall that in the Dutch 
case, the ex ante limit has been binding for more than half of all municipalities every 
year since the introduction of the block grant system. 
 
The FOC (4) is affected only if the constraint is binding at time t. In that case, the 
term )('1 tt ZB +−δ  is replaced by a term ,1 aω
δγ
±
−  where the ‘+’ applies if the grant 

















In these cases, the marginal cost of spending (the RHS of the FOC) thus becomes a 
constant.  
 
In order to be able to draw conclusions on the direction of the change in the marginal 
cost, and thereby on the effect of the ex ante limit on efficiency, we need to specify 
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the function )(1 tt ZB + . Consider plausible values of δ and ωa: δ = 0.95, ωa = 0.075 
(the value used in the Netherlands). It is easy to verify that when the ex ante limit 
kicks in, in case of a deficit the marginal cost (RHS) equals approximately 0.12γ, 
lower than under the matching grant with α = 0.25 (in which case the RHS equals αγ 
= 0.25γ). With the regression-based block grant, which is used for the Dutch 
municipalities where the ex ante limit applies, the RHS equals 1  	
  0.93
 for 
average leverage hii, which is even higher. As values exceeding two or three times the 
average value of hii (here: 0.14 or 0.21) are considered unusual (e.g., Hoaglin and 
Welsch, 1978), we may conclude that this will usually hold true. Thus, in case of a 
deficit the ex ante limit results in lower marginal cost of spending, and therefore in 
greater inefficiency. Note that for the given parameter values, in case of a surplus the 
ex ante limit implies an RHS that is slightly negative, which in our setting results in 
the maximum inefficiency level Zmax. Overall, this indicates that the ex ante limit may 
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